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 Communications technology has developed at an almost bewildering pace since the development of the internet,
with first mobiles and then smartphones ensuring that we are in near constant contact with our peers. But what
impact has this had on violence, and more specifically anti-government violence. Blake E. Garcia and Cameron
Wimpy argue that there is a correlation between access to communications technology and aggression directed at
the state and its proxies. 
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The spread of violence across state boundaries has been a long-standing concern for democratic governments.
Justifications for international military interventions often involve the stated mission to prevent the spread of violence
into neighbouring states and even economic development aid is often contingent upon such prevention. Although
there is strong empirical evidence that many forms of violence (e.g civil wars, domestic armed conflicts, terrorism,
riots, etc.) do spread into neighbouring states, how this process occurs is still unclear.
One explanation argues that large-scale conflicts tend to generate significant refugee populations, who flee into
neighbouring states. This can intensify resource competition as well as already existing ethnic frustrations, leading
to the spread of conflict. A second explanation suggests that upon learning from their observation of a successful
rebellion in a neighbouring country, individuals are more likely to emulate those actions to achieve a similar outcome
at home.
While both arguments are compelling, the first cannot explain the spread of different types of violence that we
regularly observe, such as anti-government violence, riots, and terrorism. Civil wars tend to produce refugees while
other, often less intense forms of violence do not. The second explanation assumes that actors within one country
are always more likely to be aware of the violent events occurring in their neighbor, rather than some more distant
state, simply because they share a border. Thus, empirical tests attempting to capture spatial dependence in
violence do not incorporate the variation in actors’ awareness of neighbouring events, thereby potentially
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overestimating the degree of dependence.
We argue that in order to emulate violent events in neighboring countries, actors must become aware of these
events through their exposure to information about them. We believe that increased communications capacities in
neighboring states should therefore help to facilitate the extent to which the neighboring publics emulate the violent
actions of their neighbors.
This idea is not new. For example, a substantial amount of political commentary during the Arab Spring speculated
about the role of social media in the spread of anti-government violence across northern Africa. We believe that this
might be a more generally occurring process in less developed states where there is greater variation in access to
communications capacities.
In a forthcoming article in the journal, Political Science Research and Methods, we tested the claim that increased
access to communications technologies facilitate the spread of anti-government violence in an analysis of 44 African
countries from 2000 to 2011. We utilised a unique spatial connectivity matrix that incorporated measures of state
contiguity and access to communications technology. We found that when anti-government violence increased in
one country, the expected number of violent events in its neighbours increased by 32 percent as the percentage of
cell phone subscribers moved from its mean level to one standard deviation above the mean (27 percent to 57
percent of the population).
In addition, the expected number of violent events increased by 18.9 percent when the percentage of internet users
increased by one standard deviation above the mean (4.49 percent to 11.23 percent of the population). In other
words, greater access to communications technologies can, in fact, facilitate the spread of anti-government violence,
which has potentially significant implications for democratic governments that are providing economic development
aid to less developed countries.
The U.K. government, for example, spent over £10 billion last year alone in foreign economic aid, much of which
went to countries included in the study presented here. This aid is often spent on development projects that include
the building of mobile phone towers, wireless internet connection, and other forms of advanced communication
technology. The concern then in the short term is that this aid will indirectly help to facilitate the spread of violence.
However, in the long term, it appears that higher degrees of access to this technology may be correlated with
democratic institutional features that reduce the likelihood of the spread of violence. Indeed, our research shows that
the spread of violence actually dissipates at significantly higher levels of mobile phone and internet usage. This
might mean that our findings appear to apply only to changes in usage at already particularly low levels.
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The paper on which this blog is based won the Political Science and Research Methods 2015 Best Published Paper
Award. Cambridge University Press has made the article free to access for the next year.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of Democratic Audit UK, nor of the London
School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. 
—
Blake E. Garcia is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Texas A&M
University.
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Cameron Wimpy is a research associate at Fors Marsh Group in Arlington, VA. He works on
public opinion projects and researches political economy in Africa.
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